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This paper distinguishes between objective probability—or chance—and subjective proba-
bility. Most statistical methods in machine learning are based on the hypothesis that there
is a random experiment from which we get a set of observations. This random experiment
could be identifiedwith a chance or objective probability, but these probabilities depend on
some unknown parameters. Our knowledge of these parameters is not objective and in or-
der to learn about them, we must assess some epistemic probabilities about their values. In
some cases, our objective knowledge about these parameters is vacuous, so the question is:
What epistemic probabilities should be assumed? In this paperwe argue for the assumption
of non-vacuous (a proper subset of [0, 1]) interval probabilities. There are several reasons
for this; some are based on the betting interpretation of epistemic probabilitieswhile others
are based on the learning capabilities under the vacuous representation. The implications
of the selection of epistemic probabilities in different concepts as conditioning and learning
are studied. It is shown that in order to maintain some reasonable learning capabilities we
have to assume more informative prior models than those frequently used in the literature,
such as the imprecise Dirichlet model.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
At present, the Bayesian interpretation of probability is gaining more and more ground among statisticians and practi-
tioners. According to it, the probability of an event A, P(A), is interpreted as a rational agent degree of belief [1] on the truth
of A. If we assume that this agent is a person, we have subjective Bayesian probabilities [2,3]. However, Science generally
requires drawing conclusions that can be universally accepted. So, the probabilities should be seen as supported by evidence,
or in the case of lack of information, they should be rational probabilities, accepted as non-informative assessments onwhich
to base future conclusions from available observations. This is the basis of the objective Bayesian approach [4]. Another view
of probability considers P(A) as a physical property of the event A associated with the outcome of a random experiment. It is
the propensity [5] with which A is going to be true. This probability is also known as the chance of A. For example, P(A) could
be the probability of obtaining one when throwing a dice. This probability is related to frequencies through the law of large
numbers, which states that in a sequence of independent repetitions of the experiment, the relative frequency of the cases
in which A is true converges in probability to the chance of A as the length of the sequence goes to infinity. So, frequencies
give information about chances, but only partial information, since a sequence of observations is always finite.
This paper is about chances P(A|θ) which depend on a parameter θ ∈ Θ , for which we do not have any knowledge.
This situation is common in Statistics where we have good information about the way in which data are obtained, but this
information depends of unknownparameters. Thismay be represented as a set of probabilities P(.|θ)θ∈Θ defining upper and
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lower objective probabilities P∗(A) = supθ∈Θ P(A|θ), P∗(A) = infθ∈Θ P(A|θ) [6,7]. If we want to compute the conditional
information, we should carry out the conditioning of all the possible probabilities P∗(A|B) = supθ∈Θ P(A|B, θ)1 [8,9].
However, in general this approach is too cautious in the sense that intervals tend to be too wide [10,11]. The main
reason is that the observation of B induces some information about the parameter which can be quantified as a likelihood:
l(θ) = P(B|θ) and this information is not taken into account if we assume vacuous information (all the probabilities are
possible) on Θ . In [10,11] we proposed to transform this likelihood information into a possibility measure and incorporate
it in the computation of upper and lower intervals of A given B, giving rise to narrower intervals. But in [12] it was shown
that when the possibilities and probabilities are given a betting interpretation [13], then this model could incur a sure loss.
Alternative procedures to transform the likelihood information into information about the parameterwere proposed in [12],
but they were not coherent [13]. A related work is the method of abductive inference proposed in [14]. This approach uses a
soft maximum likelihood estimation based on conditional events theory. Even if this work proposes a relaxed application
of the maximum likelihood principle, the posterior probabilities are too informative in some situations (providing precise
posterior probabilities under prior ignorance).
A method to use the likelihood information in a coherent way is to determine a non-vacuous prior information about
the parameter θ ∈ Θ which is conditioned to the likelihood function. This will be the approach pursued in this paper.
This prior information, as in the objective Bayesian approach, will not have a physical interpretation, and, at the same
time, it will not quantify subjective degrees of beliefs, but an objective representation of ignorance which could be a basis
to obtain information about the parameter. This representation will not be unique as in the logical probability approach
[15,16]. Ideally, the objectivity of this information will be based on general rationality principles (coherence, symmetry,
invariance). However, we commonly assume somany of such principles that there is not a single representation verifying all
of them [12]. At present we believe that the basis for objectivity will also have something of interpersonal agreement: the
community using the conclusions and inferences agrees in considering the prior information a solid basis for reasoning, but
not too weak on the other hand. In contrast with the pure Bayesian methodology, the prior information will not be precise
in general. The prior information will be a pair of upper and lower previsions as in [13]. The use of imprecise probabilities
to represent degrees of belief goes back to Keynes [17] but it finds a mature development inWalley’s book [13]. We find that
to represent lack of knowledge about the parameter, an imprecise representation is much more appropriate than a precise
one.
An example of this approach is the imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM) byWalley [18,19]. In this case, we have a sequence of
n independent observations from amultinomial distribution. We want to obtain information about the probability of a new
independent case. There is no previous information about the parameters of the distribution. Inferences are obtained by
assuming a family of Dirichlet distributions for them. This model has some nice properties (e.g., it verifies the representation
invariance principle [20]) and has been applied in a variety of different situations [21–25]. But in some cases it produces
too uninformative conclusions, for example when the observations are not precise and our observations only induce a
likelihood on the values of the multinomial process [26,27]. Another model recently proposed for learning from a sequence
of observations is based on the Non-parametric predictive inference methodology [28]. However, this model is not based on
imprecise prior information about the parameters which is updated by conditioning to the observations, but on a post-data
assumption about the uncertainty associated to a future observation.
In this paper we are going to study some alternative models to the IDM, but will keep using imprecise prior information
on Θ , conditioned to the observations. Some of the properties of the IDM will be lost (representation invariance and the
initial vacuous intervals under no observations), but the inferences will be more powerful in those cases where the ones
produced by the IDM seem to be too weak.
We find useful the distinction between the nature of chance probabilities, P(A|θ), and epistemic probabilities for the
parameter θ . At the end, as we have to use the epistemic probability on θ to compute probabilities on A, the final prob-
abilities for event A will also be epistemic (as they depend on the beliefs in the parameter). However, the distinction can
throw some light on some controversies related to the use of imprecise probabilities. One is the concept of conditioning.
Several different definitions can be applied [29]. The nature of the probability can be useful to select the right concept (e.g.
strong independence for chance probabilities and epistemic independence for probabilities representing beliefs). Another
important issue is the convexity of sets of probability measures P [7] (a set of chance probabilities may be non-convex,
but a set of probabilities associated to epistemic probabilities should be convex). There should be a relationship between
the epistemic probabilities and chance probabilities, but we think that the epistemic probabilities should not be always
equal to the convex hull of the chance probabilities. This will justify the fact that for A we can have two intervals: the
chance interval and the epistemic interval. In the precise case, the principle of direct inference [30,13] says that if P(A) is
the chance probability of A, then this value should be adopted as the epistemic probability of A. We do not know a direct
generalization of this principle to the case of imprecise probability. In sampling models with a nuisance parameter, Walley
[13, p. 357] considers imprecise aleatory models and epistemic models for the same variable and, taking coherence as the
basis, concludes that epistemic probabilities should dominate aleatory probabilities, since they are more informative. This
will be also the case of the models in this paper. If P(A|θ) is a chance probability, then P(A|θ) will be also our epistemic
probability of A given θ . If nothing is known about the parameter in Θ , the chance probabilities of A are in the interval
1 Assuming that P(B|θ) > 0,∀θ ∈ Θ .
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[infθ∈Θ P(A|θ), supθ∈Θ P(A|θ)]. These would be also our epistemic probabilities obtained if the vacuous prior information
on Θ is assumed, but any other prior information on Θ would give rise to intervals that are included but not necessarily
equal to this one.
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we describe the problem and introduce the basic notation.
In Section 3 the IDM is presented and we give examples showing weak behavior of this model related with conditioning.
In Section 4 we prove a result indicating the direction in which the IDM should be modified and introduce the alternative
model showing some of its properties. Finally, the conclusions will be given in Section 5.
2. Ignorance about parameters: problem and notation
Assume a parameter set Θ and a variable Z taking values in a finite set U. For each value of the parameter θ ∈ Θ , we
define a precise probability measure on the values of Z: P(.|θ), assigning a value P(Z ∈ A|θ) for each A ⊆ U. We assume
that the values P(.|θ) can be interpreted as chance probabilities and we do not have any additional information about the
parameter set Θ . In general, the problem we are going to consider is how to obtain a degree of belief for the event Z ∈ A
when Z ∈ B is observed.
The parameter spaceΘ can be discrete or continuous. If it is continuous, wewill assume that it is a compact subset ofRn.
The case of a compact subset covers the most important cases considered in the literature as the multinomial probabilities
of the IDM.
A first approach to the representation of this information is to consider the set of precise probability measures in U given
by P = {P(.|θ)}θ∈Θ . This set defines a pair of lower and upper objective probabilities:
P∗(Z ∈ A) = inf
θ∈Θ P(Z ∈ A|θ), P
∗(Z ∈ A) = sup
θ∈Θ
P(Z ∈ A|θ) (1)
If Z ∈ B is observed, this information can be integrated into the set P by means of conditioning. We can consider
conditioning using regular extension, which consists in computing the set of conditional probabilities for all the cases in
which P(Z ∈ B|θ) > 0 [13]:
PB = {P(.|θ, Z ∈ B) | θ ∈ Θ, P(Z ∈ B|θ) > 0}
We can compute again the upper and lower probabilities for any event of interest, by taking the supremum and infimum
of this set of conditional probabilities.
An alternative definition of conditioning is natural extension. The result of conditioning by natural extension is the same
as in the case of regular extension if P∗(Z ∈ B) > 0, but it is vacuous ([0, 1] interval) when P∗(Z ∈ B) = 0. Observe that, as
in that case, if P∗(Z ∈ B) > 0, then conditioning by regular extension can be very precise [13, Appendix J], [31]. So, regular
extension is in every case at least as informative as natural extension.
Whe consider that regular extension is more appropriate for working with chance probabilities, as illustrated by the
following example.
Example 1. Assume that we have two urns a1 and a2 with red, white, and black balls, and the following composition:
a1 4 red 4 white 2 black
a2 10 red 0 white 0 black
The color of a ball randomly drawn from one urn is Z. This situation corresponds to a parameter set Θ = {a1, a2} with
two different chance probabilities, one for each urn. Let us suppose that we know that the color of this ball belongs to the
set {white, black}. Natural extension would provide vacuous information (since the lower probability of this set is 0), while
regular extension would allow us to conclude that the probability of [Z = white] given Z ∈ {white, black} is equal to 2/3.
We believe that in this situation the result of regular extension is more reasonable, as we have physical probabilities, and
since the observation Z ∈ {white, black} excludes the possibility of the second urn (there are no balls of these colors in that
urn), conditioning should be applied only to the first urn. This is what regular conditioning does: it excludes probability
measures for which the probability of the observation is 0.
However, even regular extension can be too uninformative, as shown by the following example.
Example 2. Assume now that we have two urns, a1 and a2, with red and black balls, and the following composition:
a1 99 red 1 black
a2 1 red 99 black
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Consider the following problem: We draw randomly two balls with replacement from the same urn and we are allowed
to observe the color of the first ball. We want to obtain information about the color of the second ball.
This situation corresponds to a parameter set Θ = {a1, a2} (the urn we chose). The variable Z is a two dimensional
variable, Z = (X, Y), where X is the color of the first ball and Y is the color of the second ball. Let us assume that the values
of these variables are R (red) and B (black), respectively.
Since the balls are randomly chosen with replacement, we can assume that X and Y are independent. So we have two
possible probability measures, given by
(R, R) (R, B) (B, R) (R, R)
P(.|a1) 0.9801 0.0099 0.0099 0.0001
P(.|a2) 0.0001 0.0099 0.0099 0.9801
If we observe the value of the first ball, for example X = R, then the conditional probabilities for Y are:
R B
P1(.|a1, X = R) 0.99 0.01
P2(.|a2, X = R) 0.01 0.99
It can be observed that these conditional probabilities are exactly the same as the unconditional marginal probabilities
for Y . So, the observation of the red color for the first ball, X = R, does not provide any additional information about the
color of the second ball, Y . However, this result is counterintuitive: If the first ball is red, we should expect an increase in
our belief that a1 is the urn from which the balls are drawn (in this urn most of the balls are red and in a2 almost all the
balls are black); since the two balls are chosen from the same urn, our belief that the second ball is red should also increase.
However, the beliefs about the color of the second ball have not changed.
What happens in this example is that without considering some non-vacuous belief on Θ we cannot incorporate any
information in this set, i.e., Θ has no learning capability.
The type of information we will consider on Θ will be a lower prevision [13] (and the equivalent dual upper prevision).
For simplicity wewill consider previsions defined on the whole set of boundedmappings, f : Θ → R, that are measurable
with respect to a field A in Θ . This field will be the power set of Θ in the discrete case and the Borel σ -algebra if Θ is
continuous. A lower prevision P assigns a real number P(f ) to anyA-measurable f : Θ → R. This lower prevision is said to
be coherent if it satisfies the following properties:
(1) P(f ) ≥ inf f ,
(2) P(λf ) = λP(f ), ∀λ > 0,
(3) P(f + g) ≥ P(f ) + P(g).
A coherent lower prevision will represent degrees of belief with a behavioral interpretation: P(f ) is the supremum of
the selling prices for a gamble consisting in obtaining a reward f (θ) if θ is the true parameter value. If A is an event from A
then, the lower probability of A, P(A), is the supremum selling price for a gamble consisting in obtaining a reward of 1 if A
happens, i.e., P(A) = P(IA), where IA is the indicator function of A.
A lower prevision always defines a convex and closed set of finitely additive probability measures onA (a credal set [32]):
P = {P | P(f ) ≤ P(f ),∀f }
where P(f ) is the mathematical expectation of f under P.
This set is non-empty if the lower prevision is coherent.
A set of finitely additive probability measures P defined on field A always defines a coherent lower prevision by con-
sidering P(f ) equal to the infimum of the mathematical expectations P(f ) for P ∈ P (and an upper prevision by taking the
supremum). For non-finite domains, the mathematical expectation is computed using the concept of natural extension [13,
Section 3.2].
A set of probabilities and its convex hull CH(P) always define the same set of upper and lower previsions, so they can be
considered as equivalent from a behavioral point of view.
With epistemic probabilities, the primary representation is the lower prevision. The representation of the set of prob-
abilities is only an alternative way of representing the lower prevision. So, in this case, sets of probabilities can always be
assumed to be convex. We do not have a direct interpretation for the probabilities associated to a lower prevision. With
behavioral probabilities, there is not a true unknownprobability belonging to this set. Themeaning is associated to the lower
prevision and a lower prevision can always be defined by a convex set.
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The distinction between chance probabilities and beliefs is useful to determine when a set of probabilities should be
convex. There are examples in the literature where imprecise probabilities are represented by means of non-convex sets
of probabilities [33,34]. Next, we will analyze two cases presented in [33] for which it was claimed that convexity was not
justified.
Example 3. A six-sided die has been manufactured in such a way that either the outcome 1 is favored at the expense of 2
by 1/12 or conversely, and is otherwise fair. There are two possible sets of probabilities: (1/12, 3/12, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6)
and (3/12, 1/12, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6). In [33] it is argued that convexity does not make sense here since the assumption
of the uniform distribution (for example) is not justified by available data. From our point of view, we have a problem of
chance probabilities (we are talking about a physical property of the dice) with two parameters: θ1, θ2. In this case, the set
of probabilities is not necessarily convex, as this set is not the credal set associated to a lower prevision.
Example4. Imagine thatweknowthat eventsA andB are independent, and that there are twopossible probabilitymeasures,
P1 and P2. Under P1, P1(A) = P1(B) = 1/3 and under P2, we have that P2(A) = P2(B) = 2/3. Hence, we cannot make the
set convex and consider, for example, the probability P = (1/2)P1 + (1/2)P2, as with this probability P(AB) = 5/18 	=
1/4 = P(A) · P(B).
Our view of this problem is that, again, we have chance probabilities. It is a case very similar to that of the urns in Example
2. In that case, we also had two probability distributions and in each case the independence of the events (color of the balls)
was verified. The convex combination of the two probabilities does not verify independence, but if we assume chance
probabilities, convex combination is not justified. It can be said that the nature of the probabilities has not been specified.
But this is not completely true. In [29], several concepts of independence were studied for imprecise probabilities; it was
argued that themost suitable concept for epistemic probabilitieswas epistemic irrelevance. Under epistemic irrelevance, we
can have probabilities that do not verify the product rule. The product rulewasmore suitable for the case of chance objective
probabilities. So, the use of the product rule implicitly confirms the nature of the probabilities and the non-convexity of the
associated set of probabilities.
Assume now that we have a lower prevision P defined on the parameter space Θ . If we accept the principle of direct
inference [30] and assume that for any θ the precise chance probability P(.|θ) also represents our beliefs conditioned to θ
being the true value of the parameter, we can combine both sets of beliefs (lower prevision P and conditional previsions
given θ ), to obtain belief probabilities about Z , by means of the marginal extension theorem [13, Section 6.7]:
P(Z ∈ A) = P(fA)
where fA(θ) = P(A|θ). Similarly,we candefine the lower prevision of amapping g : U → R as P(fg), where fg(θ) = P(g|θ),
and P(g|θ) is themathematical expectation of g under probability P(.|θ). The combination is the least informative coherent
extension of P and conditional previsions (in this case the conditional previsions are precise, so the extension is unique).
Observe that, since the combination of epistemic probabilities on Θ and chance probabilities for Z given each possible
parameter θ , produces epistemic probabilities about Z , these probabilities are different from the lower and upper proba-
bilities considered in Eq. (1). On the one hand, we have that P(Z ∈ A) ≥ P∗(Z ∈ A), since P∗ is the minimum and the lower
prevision is always greater or equal than the minimum. So, if we consider the set of probability measures bounded by P (the
credal set associated to this prevision) we can have that there are elements from {P(.|θ)}θ∈Θ which are not in the credal set
(when inequalities are strict).
In this paper we are going to consider prior information about the parameter Θ represented by a set of probability
measuresP . The reason is that themost importantmodel considered in the literature is the Imprecise DirichletModel (IDM)
[18], which is defined in this way; however, the models should be judged in terms of the associated behavior (the upper and
lower previsions they determine). The density associated to a probability measure P ∈ P will be denoted using a lowercase
letter p.
In these conditions, we can consider the natural extension of the marginal and conditional information: the joint set of
probability measures P∗ on Θ × U obtained by considering all the probability measures that are the result of combining a
marginal measure on P ∈ P with the conditional measures P(.|θ) in the usual probabilistic sense. 2
The lower (upper) conditional previsions of Z ∈ A given that Z ∈ B can be computed by conditioning all the probabilities
in P∗ and taking the infimum (supremum):
P(Z ∈ A|Z ∈ B) = inf{Q(A|B) | Q(B) > 0,Q ∈ P∗}
This way of computing the conditioning corresponds to the regular extension [13]. Asmentioned previously, we consider
thatP (and thereforeP∗) represents epistemic beliefs and that regular extensionwasmore suitable for chance probabilities,
whereas natural extension is an alternative conditioning more suitable for epistemic probabilities. There is an apparent
2 To simplify the exposition, when Θ is continuous, we will assume that all the probabilities in Θ are defined on the Borel σ -algebra and that for any A the
function f (θ) = P(X ∈ A|θ) is measurable.
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contradiction in this fact, but we have considered regular extension as it is the conditioning under the IDM, the most
frequently used imprecise probability model. Furthermore, there are differences between natural extension and regular
extension when P(Z ∈ B) = 0, and in our modified model we will always have P(Z ∈ B) > 0. Therefore, the two methods
will be equivalent.
3. The imprecise Dirichlet model
The Imprecise Dirichlet Model (IDM) introduced by Walley [18] tries to give an answer to a situation more general than
that described in Example 2, providing prior information for the parameter set which allows meaningful inferences.
We have a sequence of independent and identically distributed variables Z = (X1, . . . , Xn, Xn+1). These variables take
values on a finite setW = {w1, . . . ,wk}. The parameter set is wider in this case:
Θ =
⎧⎨
⎩θ = (θ1, . . . , θk) | θj ≥ 0, ∀j,
k∑
j=1
θj = 1
⎫⎬
⎭
where P(Xi = wj|θ) = θj .
Now the situation is that we have observed the values of the first n variables, X1 = r1, . . . , Xn = rn, and we want to
compute the conditional probability for the values of Xn+1.
In order to be able to learn about the parameter set, the IDM considers prior information in this set. This information is
defined through a set of Dirichlet probability distributions in the parameter space. A Dirichlet distribution D(α1, . . . , αk)
has the following expression:
p(θ) =
∏k
i=1(αi)
(
∑k
i=1αi)
k∏
i=1
θ
αi−1
i
where the parameters αi are all positive, and  is the gamma function. The sum
∑k
i=1 αi is called the equivalent sample size
and is denoted by S.
The IDM consists in determining a fixed value of S, and then considering all the values of the parameters (α1, . . . , αk)
compatible with this value. The information (predictive probability) for the probability of Xn+1 = wi is given by the interval
[P(Xn+1 = wi|X1 = r1, . . . , Xn = rn), P(Xn+1 = wi|X1 = r1, . . . , Xn = rn)]
If ni is the number of cases in which Xj = wi, then this interval is easily computed as:
[
ni
n + S ,
ni + S
n + S
]
(2)
When n = 0 this interval is always [0, 1], and as n increases, the length of the interval converges to zero. So, this prior
information allows to obtain sensible inferences even when a large number of prior distributions are considered.
The IDM verifies some basic principles, of which the most important are [19]:
• Symmetry principle: Prior information in Θ should be invariant with respect to permutations.
• Likelihood principle: Posterior inferences should depend on the data through the likelihood function only.
• Coherence principle: In our case, this principle says that uncertainty should be represented by coherent lower previsions.
• Representation invariance principle: The predictive probabilities about a value do not change under coarsening or refine-
ment of some of the other values of Xj: ifwj is divided into two values,w
1
j ,w
2
j , then the inferences about Xj = wi do not
change (i 	= j). For example, if we are observing colors and one of the possible colors is red, then if we refine this value,
and the problem is changed to a different problem in which we are discriminating between light red and dark red, then
inferences about other colors, for example blue, do not change. This can be easily obtained from expression (2), where the
posterior interval for the valuewi only depends of the sample size (n), the parameter S, and the number of observations
of wi (ni), and there is no direct dependence on the frequencies of other values. Therefore, it will not change when the
other categories are changed.
The IDM has received a remarkable interest and, as stated by Bernard [35], it is one of the most popular models based on
imprecise probability (see [36] for a collection of papers on the IDM).However, the learning capabilities of the IDMhave some
limitations. For example, if the values of Xj are not directly observable, but we have an indirect procedure to observe them
with some probability of error, then nothing can be learned about the values of Xn+1 regardless how small this probability
of error is. The result shown by [27, Theorem 2] can be stated in the following way.
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Theorem 1. Let f be a bounded and continuous function defined onΘ with a maximum fmax and aminimum fmin, P an arbitrary
prior credal set defined on Θ , and o a set of observations about X1, . . . , Xn defining a likelihood function on Θ , l(·|o), then
• if l(·|o) is strictly positive in each one of the points in which f takes its maximum value and is continuous in a neighborhood
of those points, and P(f ) = fmax, we also have that P(f |o) = fmax,• if l(·|o) is strictly positive in each one of the points in which f takes its minimum value and is continuous in a neighborhood
of those points, and P(f ) = fmin, we also have that P(f |o) = fmin.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of this theorem.
Corollary 1. If A ⊆ U and o is a set of observations about X1, . . . , Xn defining a strictly positive and continuous likelihood
function onΘ , l(·|o), then for any prior model in Θ defined by a credal set P for which the interval [P(A), P(A)] = [0, 1] before
the observations, we have that after the observations [P(A|o), P(A|o)] = [0, 1].
This result is very important and sets a limit to the learning capacity of some models for representing ignorance for a
parameter. Under the IDM we have that, without observations, the lower and upper probabilities for any event are always
vacuous ([0,1]), so the Corollary is applicable and the posterior integrals will be also vacuous after any observation inducing
a likelihood in Θ which is strictly positive and continuous. When we have direct and precise observations of the observed
values Xi = ri ∈ U, then if nj is the number of times we have observed the value wj , the likelihoods induced by these
observations are l(θ |o) = ∏ki=1 θnii . These likelihoods are equal to 0 for any value θ in which θi = 0 and wi has been
observed (ni > 0). They are also equal to 0 for the values in which θi = 1 and a value wj (j 	= i) has been observed.
These zero values in the likelihoods preclude the application of Corollary 1, hence learning is not impossible in this case
(precise and direct observations are available). However, there are important situations in which we have strictly positive
and continuous likelihoods, where learning is impossible.
Example 5. Let us assume that W = {black, red} and we have a sequence of n independent variables X1, . . . , Xn taking
values on W , and for all of them P(Xi = black) = θ, P(Xi = red) = 1 − θ . Let us assume that these variables are
not directly observable and that instead of Xi we observe a variable Yi taking values on W
′ = {oblack, ored}, such that
P(Yi = oblak|Xi = black) = 1 −  and P(Yi = ored|Xi = red) = 1 − , where  is a very small positive number.
Imagine that the observations have been Yi = ored, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. The likelihood induced by these observations on Θ is
l(θ |o) = (θ · (1 − ) + (1 − θ) · ())n. When  > 0, this likelihood is always greater than 0 and continuous. So Corollary
1 applies and the interval of lower and upper probabilities for Xn+1 being red conditioned to these observations in the IDM
is [0, 1]. In the example, we do not learn anything about the probability of being red, even if we have observed n red balls
with a probability of error of  and regardless of n and . We can observe 1000 red balls with a probability of error in the
observation of 0.00001 and the posterior probability for the next ball being red is the vacuous interval [0, 1].
4. The bounded density model
In the previous section we analyzed a serious drawback of the IDM in certain circumstances. Here we are going to put
forward a way of proposing alternative models for the parameter set under lack of information in such a way that this
behavior is avoided. In order to do so, wewill consider the strong learning principle. This principle requires ameasure defined
on parameter space Θ . Prior information about the parameter will be provided by means of a set of densities which are
the Radon-Nikodyn derivatives with respect to the reference measure of a set of probability measures on Θ . For technical
reasons, it will be stated for continuous spacesΘ ⊂ Rn and the measure will be the Lebesgue measure. But it can be easily
generalized to other settings (in particular, it is immediate for a discrete parameter space).
Definition 1. We will say that the prior information given by a set of probabilities P on the parameter space Θ verifies
the strong learning principle if and only if for any sequence of observations {on}n∈N, inducing the sequence of continuous
likelihoods {ln}n∈N on Θ and for any measurable subset V of Θ such that
∫
V ln(θ)dθ∫
Θ−V ln(θ)dθ
n→∞−→ ∞
the following convergence is also verified:
P(V |ln) n→∞−→ 1
where P(.|ln) is the result of applying Bayes rule to all the probabilities in P after observing on (giving rise to likelihood ln).
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That is,we impose that if the likelihoods point out to a single parameter θ0, then the posterior probability in the parameter
space should concentrate in this parameter.
It is clear that the IDM does not verify the strong learning principle. What is the condition underlying this princi-
ple? The following theorem shows that this property is linked to the fact that prior densities are bounded and that
their infimum is greater than zero. Again, it will be only stated for continuous spaces and for densities that are the
Radon-Nikodym derivatives with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Θ , but it can be generalized to more general set-
tings (in particular, it is immediate for a discrete parameter space).
Theorem 2. A prior information P on a compact parameter space Θ given by a set of continuous densities verifies the strong
learning principle if and only if
inf
θ∈Θ infp∈P p(θ) > 0 and supθ∈Θ
sup
p∈P
p(θ) < ∞ (3)
Proof. First, we are going to prove that the strong learning principle requires (3).
Assume ex absurdo that infθ∈Θ infp∈P p(θ) = 0.
Then, as Θ is compact, there will be a sequence of points {θn}n∈N converging to a point θ0 and densities {pn}n∈N such
that {pn(θn)}n∈N converges to 0 and pn ∈ P .
From the definition of a continuous density function, we can build a sequence {Vn}n∈N of neighborhoods of θn such that
{
Pn(Vn)
|Vn|
}
n∈N
n→∞−→ 0
where |Vn| is the Lebesgue measure of Vn.
As {θn}n∈N converges to θ0, we can assume without loss of generality that the sequence {Vn}n∈N converges to θ0, i.e. for
any neighborhood V of θ0, there is an n0, such that if n ≥ n0, then Vn ⊆ V .
Consider the numbers rn = Pn(Vn)|Vn| and the sequence of likelihood functions:
ln = Vn + |Vn| · √rn
Assume a neighborhood V of θ0 such that Vn ⊆ V if n ≥ n0 (n0 is a fixed natural number) and P(V) < 1. This is
always possible, as in other case, P(Θ − V) = 0 for any neighborhood V of θ0, and there will be a point θ ′0 ∈ Θ − V
with neighborhood V ′, |V ′| > 0, and P(V ′) = 0. Then, it is immediate to show that strong learning is not verified with the
sequence of likelihoods {l′n}n∈N, given by l′n = V ′ + 1/n.
So, we have that if n ≥ n0,∫
V ln(θ)dθ∫
Θ−V ln(θ)dθ
= |Vn| +
√
rn · |Vn||V |√
rn · |Vn||Θ − V | =
1 + √rn · |V |√
rn · |Θ − V |
And this converges to ∞ as {rn}n∈N converges to 0.
For any probability P, P(.|ln) can be expressed as:
P(.|ln) = P(Vn)
P(Vn) + √rn · |Vn|P(.|Vn) +
√
rn · |Vn|
P(Vn) + √rn · |Vn|P(.)
Consider the sequence {Pn(V |ln)}n∈N. We have:
Pn(V |ln) = Pn(Vn)
Pn(Vn) + √rn · |Vn|Pn(V |Vn) +
√
rn · |Vn|
Pn(Vn) + √rn · |Vn|Pn(V)
The values
Pn(Vn)
Pn(Vn)+√rn·|Vn| are equal to
rn
rn+√rn . Since {rn}n∈N converges to 0, we have that the sequence
{
rn
rn+√rn
}
n∈N
also
converges to 0, and therefore {Pn(V |ln) − Pn(V)}n∈N converges to 0.
We have that Pn(V |ln) ≥ P(V |ln), and then the limit of these values is also greater or equal than the limit of {P(V |ln)}n∈N.
But the limit of {Pn(V |ln)}n∈N is the same as the limit of {Pn(V)}n∈N, and this limit is smaller than, or equal to P(V) < 1.
So, in conclusion the limit of {P(V |ln)}n∈N is smaller than 1. Hence, the strong learning property cannot be verified.
Next, assume ex absurdo that supθ∈Θ supp∈P p(θ) = ∞.
Then, as Θ is compact, there will be a sequence of points {θn}n∈N converging to a point θ0 and densities {pn}n∈N such
that {pn(θn)}n∈N converges to ∞ and pn ∈ P .
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From the definition of a density function, we can build a sequence {Vn}n∈N of neighborhoods of θn such that
{
Pn(Vn)
|Vn|
}
n∈N
n→∞−→ ∞
As {θn}n∈N converges to θ0, we can assume without loss of generality that the sequence {Vn}n∈N converges to θ0.
Consider the numbers rn = Pn(Vn)|Vn| , a measurable set V with |V | > 0 and such that Vn ∩ V = ∅ if n ≥ n0 (n0 is a fixed
natural number), and the sequence of likelihoods:
ln = |Vn|V + (1/√rn)Vn
Then, we have that if n ≥ n0,∫
V ln(θ)dθ∫
Θ−V ln(θ)dθ
= |Vn||V |
(1/
√
rn)|Vn| =
√
rn · |V |
And this converges to ∞ as {rn}n∈N converges to ∞.
For any probability P, P(.|ln) can be expressed as:
P(.|ln) = P(V)|Vn|
P(V)|Vn| + P(Vn)(1/√rn)P(.|V) +
P(Vn)(1/
√
rn)
P(V)|Vn| + P(Vn)(1/√rn)P(.|Vn)
= Pn(V)
Pn(V) + (rn/√rn)Pn(.|V) +
Pn(Vn)(rn/
√
rn)
Pn(V) + (rn/√rn)Pn(.|Vn)
The last equality is obtained by replacing Pn(Vn) by rn|Vn| in both denominators and canceling |Vn| in the numerators
and denominators.
Consider the sequence {Pn(V |ln)}n∈N. We have:
Pn(V |ln) = Pn(V)
Pn(V) + (rn/√rn)Pn(V |V) +
Pn(Vn)(rn/
√
rn)
Pn(V) + (rn/√rn)Pn(V |Vn)
= Pn(V)
Pn(V) + √rn +
√
rn
Pn(V) + √rn Pn(V |Vn)
Since {rn}n∈N converges to∞, the sequence
{
Pn(V)
Pn(V)+√rn
}
n∈N
also converges to 0, and therefore {Pn(V |ln)−Pn(V |Vn)}n∈N
converges to 0.
We have that Pn(V |ln) ≥ P(V |ln), so the limit of these values is also greater or equal than the limit of {P(V |ln)}n∈N.
But the limit of {Pn(V |ln)}n∈N is the same than the limit of {Pn(V |Vn)}n∈N, and this limit is equal to 0 (as Vn ∩ V = ∅ if
n ≥ n0).
So, the limit of {P(V |ln)}n∈N is equal to 0; hence, the strong learning property cannot be verified.
Conversely, if infθ∈Θ infp∈P p(θ) = α > 0 and supθ∈Θ supp∈P p(θ) = β < ∞, then for any P ∈ P , we have that
P(V |ln) =
∫
V p(θ)ln(θ)dθ∫
Θ p(θ)ln(θ)dθ
=
∫
V p(θ)ln(θ)dθ∫
V p(θ)ln(θ)dθ +
∫
Θ−V f (θ)ln(θ)dθ
Taking into accounts the bounds on the density functions, we have
P(V |ln) ≥ α
∫
V ln(θ)dθ
α
∫
V ln(θ)dθ + β
∫
Θ−V ln(θ)dθ
Since the right-hand side does not depend on P, it follows that:
P(V |ln) ≥ α
∫
V ln(θ)dθ
α
∫
V ln(θ)dθ + β
∫
Θ−V ln(θ)dθ
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And this values converges to 1 if
∫
V ln(θ)dθ∫
Θ−V ln(θ)dθ
n→∞−→ ∞ 
This theorem has been proved for continuous densities, but it can be stated for more general densities. In particular, for
the case where Θ is finite, the condition is simpler: P(θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ .
The strong learning principle and the representation invariance principle are incompatible under coherence and sym-
metry, as the following theorem shows which is stated in the framework of the IDM (we have a sequence of independent
and identically distributed variables from a multinomial distribution).
Theorem3. There is no prior coherent information onΘ given by a set of continuous densities verifying symmetry, representation
invariance, and the strong learning principles.
Proof. If all the principles are verified, we are going to prove the existence of a contradiction.
Assume that the set of possible different values of variables Xj is W with k elements. We have shown that the strong
learning principle implies that the densities are bounded (by a lower and an upper bound). Then, without observations,
P(X1 = wi) = ai, where ai > 0. If we consider symmetry, then all the values ai (i = 1, . . . , k) should be equal to a value
a > 0. Coherence implies that 1 = P(X1 ∈ W) ≥ ∑ki=1 P(X1 = wi) = (k · a). So 1 ≤ k.a = k.P(X1 = wi). Now, if other
value (wj, j 	= i) is split in two different values, then the number of possible values of X1 will increase from k to k+ 1, being
P(X1 = wi) invariant by the representation invariance principle. Repeating the split a number of times, we can make the
number of values of X1 equal to k
′ > 1/P(X1 = wi). But, by the same arguments used before splitting, now applied to the
new set of values 1 ≤ k′ · P(X1 = wi), which is contradictory. 
For us, the coherence, symmetry, and likelihood principles are fundamental principles and there are no reasons to doubt
about them. Now,we can pose themain question in this paper:Which of the two principles, representation invariance or strong
learning, should be kept? It clearly appeals to intuition that changes in the specification of values different from wi should
not affect the upper and lower probabilities ofwi and also that under complete ignorance and without any observations the
interval for P(X1 = wi) is [0, 1]. But learning seems to be important as well: If all the observations point to a set, then the
posterior information should also point to that set. Our opinion, supported by the following arguments, is that learning is
more important than representation invariance:
• The specification of the problemwith the set of possible valuesW = {w1, . . . ,wk} is in itself relevant information, so the
beliefsmight depend on this information. In the IDMwith perfect observationswe know that valueswi are observable, or
if the observations are not perfectwe have an indirectmeasuring procedure based on these events: Xi = wj . For example,
if W = {red, blue}, this means that red and blue are the possible values for the multinomial variables and that we can
observe these values. If they are two slightly different types of blue, blue1 and blue2, but we cannot observe them, then
we should not changeW toW ′ = {red, blue1, blue2}. Even if it is possible to observe them, we may not be interested in
the two different versions of blue, and if we are interestedwe believe that the language is not completely neutral and that
the beliefs for red in case W ′ = {red, blue1, blue2} could be different from the beliefs in red if W ′ = {red, blue, green}.
In the first case, the beliefs for red could be the same as forW = {red, blue}, but different in the second case.
Another example is the case of an insurance company. When they fix the premium for a life insurance, they base it
on the estimation of the probability that a person will die during next year. They can refine the space in which they are
computing the probabilities by taking into account some factors like age, gender, etc. But these variables are in some
way determined by the problem we are considering: first, they have to be observable and relevant to the problem. But
there can be other factors likemodel simplicity (as simplemodels are easier to estimate from data than complexmodels,
since they have less parameters 3 ) and legal issues (for example, if religion is relevant through its influence in some life
habits, it is possible that it cannot be taken into account to differentiate the premium). So, the values of variables can be
determined by the problem at hand and there is not full freedom to change the problem specification without changing
its nature.
• Even if we do not have previous information about the problem which can be used to determine the set of values, there
are procedures for model selection which can be used to determine the most appropriate set of values for a variable.
For example, to discretize a continuous variable [38] we start with a continuous set of values and we try to determine
the most suitable set of values. For this task several procedures can be used and the result will depend on the available
observations and the problem at hand (for example, we may want to solve a specific classification problem). So, here
again the set of values is not completely arbitrary: a value should not be divided into two subvalues if there are no specific
reasons to do it.
• The representation invariance principle and symmetry imply that without observations P(X1 = wi) is vacuous (the
interval [0,1]). However, in the parameter space Θ we assume non-vacuous information. For example, in the IDM, for
3 This is done by automatic learning algorithms that usually include a penalty for model complexity [37].
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each A ⊆ Θ , we have a non-vacuous pair of lower and upper probabilities; P(A), P(A) for an event A ⊆ Θ . The question
is: Why is it convenient to assume a vacuous prior information onW but not in Θ? Of course, if we do not assume non-
vacuous information on Θ , then learning is not possible. But it is also true that after assuming vacuous information on
W , then learning after indirect observations is not possible. Variables Xi represent a physical property, but the parameter
space is related with chance probabilities representing also a physical property of a random experiment. In most cases,
these probabilities can only be observed indirectly. But in other situations they can be also directly observable. Think of
an urn example in which the real probabilities can be observed if we perfectly know the urn composition. In example 2,
we have two urns which can be interpreted as a parameter space Θ = {a1, a2}. We know that we have to assume non-
vacuous information about the urns in order to learn something from the observation of the first ball. Now, imagine that
the experiment consists in selecting one of the urns with an unknown probability and then drawing two balls without
replacement from the same urn. In this case, the parameter space is [0, 1] (the probability of selecting the first urn), and
the urn and the color of the two balls (ai, c1, c2) are the values of Xj . The urn has changed from the parameter space to
the set of values of the variable. Should we now consider vacuous information about the urns? We think that nothing
has changed from the first time we select the urns. There is the same degree of ignorance when we select an urn using a
completely unknown procedure as when we follow a random procedure of unknown probability (at least the first time
the experiment is performed). In any case, a completely unknown procedure should be more imprecise than a random
procedure with unknown probability, but in the IDM spirit the former case is not vacuous (it is a part of the parameter
space) whereas the latter is vacuous (it is the first observation of a sequence of independent observations).
• Under the betting interpretation of epistemic probabilities, if A ⊆ W then P(A) is the supremum buying price for a
gamble inwhichwe get 1 unit of utility if A happens. If P(A) = a, we are ready to pay ax to obtain x for any value of x > 0.
The smaller the a, the less risky will be the assessment as the buying price of gamble A is lower. Of course, if a = 0 the
risk is null. But the question is: Is there a small value  > 0, such that we are ready to pay .x to obtain x if A is observed?
Even if I am completely ignorant about A, our opinion is that the existence of this value is reasonable. It could be argued
that, since x > 0 is arbitrary, we can lose a large amount of utility by accepting a bet on an event about which we are
ignorant. But in practice we believe that there is an upper bound for x. Walley [13, Section 2.2] introduces the probability
currency as a simple linear utility scale for rewards. In this currency, what we win or lose are tickets for a lottery with a
single valuable price. The value of this single valuable price can be considered the upper bound for the real value of x.
The non-parametric Predictive Inference methodology does not verify the RIP principle either [28], which is not seen as
a disadvantage, but as a way of avoiding some undesirable behaviors.
If we admit the strong learning principle, then for a parameter spaceΘ and prior information representing ignorance P ,
we should have that there are values α, β > 0, such that for any p ∈ P we have α ≤ p(θ) ≤ β,∀θ ∈ Θ . These bounds
should depend onΘ since in other case we can have that there is no density function verifying them. The simplest way is to
make the bounds depend on |Θ|. Following this idea, we propose the Bounded Density Model, according to which ignorance
about a parameter space Θ is represented by considering the set P of all the densities verifying:
α
|Θ| ≤ p(θ) ≤
β
|Θ|
It depends on two parameters, 0 < α < 1 and β > 1. Even if P contains non continuous densities, it verifies the strong
learning principle as all of the densities are bounded.
A relation between these two parameters, α and β , can be obtained by considering that, if U = {a1, a2}with parameter
spaceΘ = [0, 1], where θ is the probability of a1, then the Bounded Density Model onΘ should produce upper and lower
probabilities equivalent to the ones given by bounds:
α
2
≤ P(X = ai) ≤ β
2
This is based on the idea that the first case of a random experiment with unknown probability should produce the
same belief probabilities as an unknown procedure to select a value in U (the Bounded Density Model in the two spaces
should produce the same belief probabilities on U). In the rest of the paper, we will consider that the two parameters are
free.
Thewider the interval [α, β] themore imprecisewill be theprior information, and therefore the lowerwill be the learning
capability. However, we think that a wide interval, for example α = 0.1, β = 11, will produce quite uninformative interval
probabilities for the first observation, while showing conditional probabilities similar to those obtained using the IDMwhen
we have perfect observations and giving rise to non-vacuous meaningful intervals in case we have indirect non-perfect
observations, as it will be shown in Example 7 below. Our initial intuition, is that the role of bounds α,β is only to exclude
very extreme prior densities.
An important aspect of the model is the computational issue. To compute upper and lower previsions of a gamble f , in
the continuous case it is generally enough to consider extreme densities, pA, determined by a measurable subset A ⊂ Θ of
size |A| = |Θ|.(1−α)
β−α by:
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pA(θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
β
Θ
if θ ∈ A
α
Θ
if θ ∈ Θ − A
where |A| is the Lebesgue measure of A.
The size of the set A is determined taking into account that
∫
Θ pA(θ)dθ = 1. pA takes the maximum value on A and the
minimum possible value outside of A.
To compute the upper prevision of f we have to determine a set A of this size such that f (θ) ≥ f (θ ′),∀θ ∈ A, θ ′ ∈ Θ −A
(we consider the bounded density that concentrates in the larger values of f ). Similarly, the lower prevision can be computed.
Densities pA cannot generate the whole set of bounded densities in P by finite convex combinations. The reason is very
simple. Anyfinite convex combination
∑k
i=1 ai ·pAi , where
∑k
i=1 ai = 1, ai ≥ 0, only takes a finite number of different values,
and there are bounded densities that take a continuous set of possible values. However, this finite convex combinations can
uniformly approximate any bounded density with an arbitrary error  > 0.
Theorem 4. If p is a density on Θ such that
α
|Θ| ≤ p(θ) ≤
β
|Θ|
where α < 1 < β , then, for any  > 0, there is a finite collection of subsets Ai ⊆ Θ and numbers ai ≥ 0, with∑ki=1 ai = 1
such that∣∣∣∣∣∣p(θ) −
k∑
i=1
ai · pAi(θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ , ∀θ
Proof. To simplify the notation and without loss of generality, let us assume that |Θ| = 1. The only change for a general
Θ would be that |Θ|would appear in the denominator of the fractions bounding the densities, and in the numerator of the
fractions determining the size of sets Ai.
Let us consider an arbitrary natural number m and the approximation of a density p, given by
∑m
i=1(1/m) · pAi where
sets Ai are defined in a recursive way:
• A1 is a set of size (1−α)β−α such that p(θ) ≥ p(θ ′),∀θ ∈ A1, θ ′ ∈ Θ − A1. The elements of set A1 are selected among the
elements of Θ with higher value of p. Let us consider p1 = p − (1/m) · pA1
• Ai+1 is a set of size (1−α)β−α such that pi(θ) ≥ pi(θ ′),∀θ ∈ Ai+1, θ ′ ∈ Θ − Ai+1. This set Ai+1 is a set selected in a similar
way as A1, but now considering pi instead of p. Let us consider pi+1 = pi − (1/m) · pAi+1 .
Let us prove that if (m − j − 1) > β−α
β−1 andm − j − 1 > β−α1−α , then we have that
α − (j/m)α ≥ pj(θ) ≥ β − (j/m)β
Let us prove it by induction. For j = 1, we have that given the definition of A1, then p(θ) ≥ 1, ∀θ ∈ A1 and p(θ) ≤
1, ∀θ ∈ Θ − A1. Given that p1 = p − (1/m) · pA1 and the definition of pA1 , we have that
1 − (1/m)β ≤ p1(θ) ≤ β − (1/m)β, ∀θ ∈ A1
α − (1/m)α ≤ p1(θ) ≤ 1 − (1/m)α, ∀θ ∈ Θ − A1
But given inequalities (1/m) <
β−1
β−α and (1/m) <
1−α
β−α , we canprove that 1−(1/m)β ≥ α−(1/m)α and1−(1/m)α ≤
β − (1/m)β , with which the desired inequalities are obtained for j = 1.
Assumethat the inequalities are true for j and letusprove themfor j+1.Given thedefinitionofAj+1 and taking intoaccount
that the expectation of pj with respect to the Lebesguemeasure inΘ is 1− j/m, we have that pj(θ) ≥ (m− j)/m,∀θ ∈ Aj+1
and pj(θ) ≤ (m − j)/m,∀θ ∈ Θ − Aj+1.
In these conditions,
(m − j)/m − (1/m)β ≤ pj+1(θ) ≤ β − ((j + 1)/m)β, ∀θ ∈ Aj+1
α − ((j + 1)/m)α ≤ pj+1(θ) ≤ (m − j)/m − (1/m)α, ∀θ ∈ Θ − Aj+1
In a similar way to the base case, we can prove that if (m − (j + 1) − 1) > β−α
β−1 and m − (j + 1) − 1 > β−α1−α , then
(m − j)/m − (1/m)β ≥ α − ((j + 1)/m)α and (m − j)/m − (1/m)α ≤ β − ((j + 1)/m)β , with which we obtain the
desired inequalities for j + 1.
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Let j0 be the highest value of j for which (m − j − 1) > β−αβ−1 and m0 = m − j0. This value m0 is constant and does not
depend onm.
Now, we have that
p(θ) −
m∑
i=1
(1/m) · pAi(θ) = p(θ) −
j0∑
i=1
(1/m) · pAi(θ) −
m∑
i=j0+1
(1/m) · pAi(θ)
= pj0(θ) −
m∑
i=j0+1
(1/m) · pAi(θ)
Taking into account the proven inequalities, we have that
(m0/m)α ≤ pj0(θ) ≤ (m0/m)β
and considering the bounds for pAi and also that we are addingm − (j0 + 1) + 1 = m0 densities, we have
(m0/m)α ≤
m∑
i=j0+1
(1/m) · pAi(θ) ≤ (m0/m)β
So, putting these inequalities together we obtain:
|p(θ) −
m∑
i=1
(1/m) · pAi(θ)| ≤ (2m0/m)(β − α)
and the value (2m0/m)(β − α) can be made lower than any  > 0, takingm large enough. 
If we want to compute the upper and lower previsions of a bounded andmeasurable f given some observation Z ∈ B, the
problem is not simple to solve in general form. Nowwe have to compute all the conditional densities, and then those which
maximize or minimize the expected value of f . Imagine that the observation induces likelihood l; in that case, we need to
compute the supremum and infimum of
P(f |l) =
∫
Θ f (θ)l(θ)p(θ)dθ∫
Θ l(θ)p(θ)dθ
Since an arbitrary density can be uniformly approximated by a convex combination of extreme densities, these values
are the supremum and infimum of:
PA(f |l) =
∫
Θ f (θ)l(θ)pA(θ)dθ∫
Θ l(θ)pA(θ)dθ
= β
∫
A f (θ)l(θ)dθ + α
∫
Θ−A f (θ)l(θ)dθ
β
∫
A l(θ)dθ + α
∫
Θ−A l(θ)dθ
where PA is the probability measure associated to density pA.
The problem is that, for a general likelihood, there is no direct procedure to compute the set A for which the density pA
maximizes (or minimizes) the value PA(f |l), since it is a non-simple fractional optimization problem. There can be special
cases (like the multinomial sequence of independent observations) in which we can obtain a direct method to compute the
upper and lower probabilities of certain types of events.
In the discrete case, the set of extreme probabilities can be computed from the intervals α|Θ| ≤ p(θ) ≤ β|Θ| in an efficient
way (see [39] for a fast algorithm that computes the extreme probabilities of the credal set associated to a set of intervals
for the probabilities of elementary events) and then we can compute using these extreme probabilities.
In the following examples we assume that α = 0.1, β = 11.
Example 6. Consider the case of Example 2. In the parameter space of the two urns, Θ = {a1, a2}, we have the following
extreme probabilities:
P1(a1) = 0.1, P1(a2) = 0.9; P2(a1) = 0.9, P2(a2) = 0.1
Without observing the color of the first ball, the lower an upper probabilities of the Bounded Density Model (α =
0.1, β = 11) for the color of the second ball are:
P(Y = R) = 0.108, P(Y = R) = 0.892
P(Y = B) = 0.108, P(Y = B) = 0.892
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However, if we have observed that the first ball is red (X = R) then, conditional to this information, the upper and lower
probabilities are (with three significant digits):
P(Y = R|X = R) = 0.908, P(Y = R|X = R) = 0.989
P(Y = B|X = R) = 0.011, P(Y = B|X = R) = 0.092
It can be noticed that, before the observations, the belief intervals are a bit smaller than the objective probability intervals
(the objective intervals were [0.01, 0.99]), but now learning is possible, and if we observe that the color of the first ball is
red, we would also expect the color of the second ball to be red as well.
Example 7. Consider a sequence of Bernoulli trials with two possible values {a1, a2}. The parameter space is Θ = [0, 1],
where θ = P(Xi = a1).
The extreme densities to compute the lower and upper probabilities of X1 = a1 are (remember that α = 0.1, β = 11):
p1(θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩ 11 if θ ≤ (0.9/10.9)0.1 if θ > (0.9/10.9)
p2(θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩ 0.1 if θ ≤ (10/10.9)11 if θ > (10/10.9)
They give rise to the following lower and upper probabilities without observations:
P(X1 = a1) = 0.0796, P(X1 = a1) = 0.9204
Remember that using the IDM these lower and upper probabilities were 0 and 1.
If we observe that X = a1, the upper and lower probabilities for the second value are:
P(X2 = a1|X1 = a1) = 0.4192, P(X2 = a1|X1 = a1) = 0.9558
In the IDM with S = 1, the interval would have been [0.5, 1]. They are not very different, but in the IDM with S = 1
there is a slightly larger support to the fact that the result of the second observation is equal to the first.
Nevertheless, themain advantage of the Bounded Density Model is that, if instead of observing X1 for a very small  > 0,
we observe a variable Y1 with values {oa1, oa2}, where P(Y1 = oa1|X1 = a1) = 1− , P(Y1 = oa2|X1 = a2) = 1− , then
P(X2 = a1|Y1 = oa1) = 0.4192 + h(), P(X2 = a1|Y1 = oa1) = 0.9558 + h()
where h() converges to 0, when  goes to 0.
However in the IDM these conditional intervals are always [0,1].
A way to modify the IDM so it resembles the Bounded Density Model is to assume a fixed sample size S, but instead of
considering all the Dirichlet distributions D(α1, . . . , αk)where
∑
i αi = S, setting a lower limit γ > 0 and including in the
model only those distributions in which αi ≥ γ . For a small γ , the behavior will be very similar to that of the IDM, with
the same dependence on the sample size S. We will call this model the Bounded Imprecise Dirichlet Model. This model was
already used in [40] to test the independence of two categorical variables, since the original IDM model was also too little
informative and, hence, useless to discriminate between independence and dependence.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the problem of inference in a situation inwhichwe have a random variable with chance
probabilities depending on the values of a parameter for which we do not have any information. We have to represent some
epistemic information in the parameter space in order to be able to learn from observations of the random variable and
this information cannot be completely vacuous. We have studied the use of IDM for this task and also pointed to the fact
that in some situations this model is too uninformative (already proved in [26]). We have shown that in order to be able to
learn from some type of observations in which, intuitively there is information available, it is necessary that the densities
are bounded and greater than some positive value. This implies that the invariance representation principle is not verified.
We have argued that the learning capability is more important than the representation invariance principle, and proposed
a new model, the Bounded Density Model, showing its behavior in a few examples.
We have assumed that the parameter spaceΘ is compact. We think that our approach can be easily generalized to non-
closed measurable sets, but there there are difficulties with unbounded ones. There can be cases in which the parameter
space is not initially bounded (as themean value of a Gaussian distribution). To apply the Bounded DensityModelwe have to
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determine a bounded subset of the original one to which this parameter must belong. This assumes some prior information,
but it is reallyweak and inmost of the practical situations it is not difficult to assess someprior bounds. A possible alternative
is to use a transformation of an unbounded set as [0,+∞) into a bounded one ([0, 1)) using for example x/(1 + x).
We plan to investigate the computational aspect providing direct methods to determine the upper and lower previsions
given a set of observations in general situations. Another important point is the definition of models which are simpler to
compute than the bounded density model, as the Bounded Imprecise Dirichlet Model, which represents a good compromise
between the IDM and the Bounded Density Model. We believe that in a particular problem, the selected model can depend
on the task for which is used. For example, recent experiments in learning Bayesian networks with scores based on prior
uniform Dirichlet distributions D(S/k, . . . , S/k) show that the equivalent sample size S is fundamental [41]. When S is
very small, learned graphs tend to be empty, and when S is large they tend to be full. So, in this case imprecision can be
represented by considering an interval [S∗, S∗] for the equivalent sample size (S) and for each sample size considering that
all the αi parameters are equal (i.e. instead of considering a fix S and changing the values of the αi parameter as in the IDM,
the parameter S varies and this value is uniformly distributed among the αi parameters).
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